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Abstract— This paper investigates the impact of a uniform cir-AQ:1 1
cular array (UCA) in the context of wireless security via exposure2
region-based beamforming. An improvement is demonstrated for3
the security metric proposed in our previous paper, namely,4
the spatial secrecy outage probability (SSOP), by optimizing5
the configuration of the UCA. Our previous paper focused on6
formalizing the SSOP concept and exploring its applicability7
using a uniform linear array example. This paper proposes the8
UCA as a superior candidate because it is more robust against9
the effects of mutual coupling. The UCA’s SSOP configuration10
is explored and a special expression is derived from the general11
expression for the first time, and a closed-form upper bound is12
then generated to facilitate analysis. By carefully designing the13
UCA structure particularly the radius, an SSOP optimization14
algorithm is derived and explored for mutual coupling. It is15
shown that the information leakage to eavesdroppers is reduced16
while the legitimate user’s received signal quality is enhanced17
due to the use of beamforming.18
Index Terms— Physical layer security, beamforming, exposure19
region, spatial secrecy outage probability, uniform circular array.20
I. INTRODUCTION21
W IRELESS communication is vulnerable to passive22 eavesdropping due to its broadcast nature. Physical23
layer security exploits the unique and unpredictable features24
of wireless channels such as fading and has shown a great25
potential to secure future wireless technologies [1], [2]. This26
technique dates back to Wyner’s seminal work on the wiretap27
channel model [3], which has triggered much fruitful research28
and has been extended to various channel models, such as29
fading channels and multiple antenna channels [4]–[7].30
In the physical layer security scenario with legitimate users31
wishing to carry out secure communication with eavesdroppers32
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observing the transmissions, the channel of the legitimate user 33
in Wyner’s wiretap channel model is required to be better than 34
that of the eavesdroppers, at least for a fraction of realizations 35
in the case of fading channels [4]. When the legitimate 36
transmitter is equipped with multiple antennas or an antenna 37
array, beamforming is an effective technique to enlarge the 38
difference of the legitimate users’ and eavesdroppers’ channel 39
quality and can be achieved by exploiting the channel state 40
information (CSI) [8] or the location information [9]. 41
Beamforming can be used to create physical regions within 42
which any user can correctly receive the message [10]–[13]; 43
the area was defined as an ‘exposure region’ (ER) in [10]. 44
However, these regions were not based on information- 45
theoretic parameters, such as secrecy capacity or secrecy 46
outage probability (SOP) [4], and thus lacked a quantitative 47
measure of the security level. On the other hand, some AQ:248
information theoretical based methods lacked of the analysis 49
from a physical perspective, for example, the aspect of antenna 50
arrays [14]–[18]. 51
In our previous work [19], we proposed an 52
ER-based beamforming approach which led to the derivation 53
of the spatial secrecy outage probability (SSOP) from an 54
information-theoretic perspective and links with the antenna 55
array configuration. Fig. 1 illustrates a transmitter (Alice) 56
with an antenna array that communicates to a legitimate 57
user (Bob) in the presence of eavesdroppers (Eves) with 58
their location distribution following a Poisson point process 59
(PPP); this hints towards the utilization of location in the 60
Wyner’s channel model. The ER is defined by the physical 61
region where any PPP distributed Eve causes secrecy outage 62
to the legitimate transmission in the Rician fading channel. 63
In [19], the secrecy outage caused by PPP distributed Eves is 64
quantitatively measured by the SSOP that is derived from the 65
ER. The general expression of the SSOP for any type of array 66
is derived and the uniform linear array (ULA) is used as an 67
example to explore the properties of the array parameters. 68
Based on the knowledge of the previous work, we advance 69
knowledge in this paper by optimizing the array parameters. 70
The uniform circular array (UCA) is chosen rather than 71
the ULA because of practical considerations, namely mutual 72
coupling. Mutual coupling is the electromagnetic interaction 73
between the antenna elements of an array and is always 74
associated with multiple antenna techniques [20], [21]. In [22], 75
it has been shown that linear arrays are susceptible to mutual 76
coupling, thus rendering no effective optimum solution for 77
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Fig. 1. The enclosed area surrounding Bob illustrates the ER created using
a circular antenna array.
minimizing the SSOP. On the other hand, the UCA is less78
affected and produces a more symmetric beam pattern around79
360◦ [23]. Thus, it is chosen as the candidate to exhibit the80
optimization of the array parameters, especially the radius.81
We assume that Bob’s location information is available at
AQ:3
82
Alice, which is similar to that used in [9]. For example,83
Bob could send his own location information to Alice, if84
he wishes to be served by Alice with additional security85
features. Alice exploits Bob’s location information to perform86
the beamforming.87
In fading channels, the security performance of the afore-88
mentioned system, i.e., Alice using beamforming to enlarge89
the difference between Bob’s and Eves’ channels, can be90
expressed in terms of secrecy outage. In [24], the secrecy91
outage probability (SOP) for a single Eve is given by the92
probability that Eve’s channel capacity is higher than a certain93
threshold; this is defined by the difference between the rate94
of the transmitted codewords and that of the confidential95
information, conditioned on Bob’s channel capacity being96
larger than the rate of the transmitted codewords. In other97
words, the ER is an enclosed area within the boundary where98
Eve’s channel capacity is just equal to that threshold. As Eve’s99
channel capacity is random due to fading, the boundary of the100
ER shifts. In Fig. 1, the dashed curve depicts an ER boundary101
for a deterministic channel, which resembles the shape of the102
array pattern.103
Intuitively, the smaller the ER is, the less possible that104
Eves are located inside the ER, and therefore the more secure105
the transmission will be. The overall secrecy outage caused106
by PPP distributed Eves, i.e., SSOP, is calculated with the107
aid of stochastic geometry theory, which links the security108
performance with the UCA parameters. This paper builds109
substantially on our previous work [19], [25] by investigating110
the SSOP with respect to UCA parameters in Rician fading111
channel and creating an optimization algorithm which min-112
imizes the SSOP by adjusting the radius. In addition, the113
impact of mutual coupling is examined on the SSOP using114
a numerical simulation tool, i.e., NEC [26]. In essence, this115
sets the scene for setting secure regions in wireless networks.116
The main contributions of this paper are:117
• Deriving the expression of the SSOP for the UCA and118
the closed-form expression of its upper bound for the first119
time, thus revealing the relationship between the security120
performance and various parameters, especially the radius121
of the UCA.122
• Based on the expressions of the SSOP for the UCA,123
the first investigation of the security performance of124
ER-based beamforming for a Rician fading channel with 125
respect to radius is presented. Simulation and numerical 126
results are covered, which show how the behavior of 127
averaged SSOP varies with the radius. 128
• An optimization algorithm is derived based on the above 129
analysis, which enhances the security level by optimizing 130
the radius for all of Bob’s possible angles. The impact of 131
the mutual coupling with the radius is compared with 132
the optimization algorithm and shows that while the 133
algorithm in general is valid, the optimum value needs 134
to be calculated using numerical data. 135
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, 136
the system model is introduced and the definitions of the ER 137
and the SSOP are presented. In Section III, the closed-form 138
expression of the upper bound is derived and from this the 139
impact of the radius of the UCA is analyzed. In Section IV, the 140
optimization problem is established and analyzed with respect 141
to the UCA array parameters; an algorithm is then created with 142
the aim of decreasing the SSOP. In Section V, simulation and 143
numerical results are given. Section VI concludes the paper. 144
II. EXPOSURE REGION AND SPATIAL SECRECY 145
OUTAGE PROBABILITY 146
A. System Model 147
As the paper builds on [19], the system model is the same 148
except for the UCA aspect. For this reason, the essential 149
symbols, concepts and derivations for the UCA are described 150
briefly to avoid repetition. Let’s assume that Alice is equipped 151
with an antenna array while Bob and Eves have a single 152
antenna. As shown in Fig. 1, Alice is located at the origin 153
point. For convenience, assume that the first element of the 154
UCA is on the positive x-axis. The coordinate is denoted by 155
z = (d, θ), and subscripts B and Ei are used to represent 156
Bob and the i th Eve respectively, ∀i ∈ N+. A general user’s 157
location is referred to by z when no subscript is specified. 158
Eves are assumed to be non-colluding and distributed by a 159
homogeneous PPP, e with density λe [27]. 160
On the transmitter side, the UCA has N elements 161
and radius R, and the array vector of UCA is s(θ) = 162
[e− jφ1(θ), . . . , e− jφi (θ), . . . , e− jφN (θ)]T , θ ∈ [0, 2π], where 163
φi (θ) = k R cos(θ −ψi ), and ψi = 2π(i −1)/N is the angular 164
location of the i th element [28] and k = 2π/λ, where λ is 165
the wavelength of the carrier signal. Pt is the transmit power. 166
Given Bob’s location information, θB , the beamforming weight 167
vector can be set as w = s(θB)/
√
N . 168
Assume a Rician channel with factor K . The channel gain 169
vector is given by 170
h(z) = d−β/2(
√
K
K + 1s(θ) +
√
1
K + 1g
)
, (1) 171
where d−β/2 denotes the large-scale path loss with the path 172
loss exponent β of typical values between 2 and 6. The 173
line-of-sight (LOS) component is
√
K
K+1 s(θ); the non-LOS 174
component is
√
1
K+1 g, where g = [g1, . . . , gi , . . . , gN ]T , 175
gi ∼ CN (0, 1), and the elements of g are independent. 176
Thus, the received signal at z is the sum of the beamforming 177
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weighted signals and noise, which can be expressed by r(z) =178 √
Pt hT (z)w∗x + nW , where x is the modulated symbol with179
unit power and nW is the additive white Gaussian noise with180
zero mean and variance σ 2n .181
For the ease of subsequent mathematical derivations, let h˜182
be an equivalent channel factor, i.e.,183
h˜ = hT (z)w∗ =
√
K
K + 1 G(θ, θB) +
√
1
K + 1 g, (2)184
where G(θ, θB) = s(θ)s∗(θB)/
√
N is an array factor for any185
array type and g ∼ CN (0, 1). According to (2), |h˜|2 can be186
decomposed as follows:187
|h˜|2 = K G
2(θ, θB)
K + 1 +
g2Re+g2I m
K + 1 +
2
√
K G(θ, θB)
K + 1 gRe, (3)188
where gRe and gI m are the real and imaginary part of g,189
so, gRe, gI m ∼ N (0, 12 ). For the UCA, the array factor was190
derived in [28] and is given by191
G(θ, θB) = 1√
N
N∑
i=1
e jk R[cos(θB−ψi )−cos(θ−ψi )]. (4)192
The channel capacity, denoted by C(z), is given by193
C(z) = log2
(
1 + Pt |h˜|
2
σ 2n dβ
)
. (5)194
For convenience, let CB = C(zB) and CEi = C(zEi ) denote195
the channel capacities of Bob and the i th Eve hereinafter. Due196
to the fact that |h˜|2 scales with G(θ, θB), a proper design of197
G(θ, θB) can improve CB while decreasing CEi .198
B. Definitions for ER and SSOP for UCA199
As in [24], let RB and Rs be the rate of the transmitted code-200
words and the rate of the confidential information, respectively.201
A secrecy outage event occurs when Eve’s channel capacity is202
higher than the difference RB − Rs conditioned on CB ≥ RB ,203
and the probability of such an event is the SOP. Note that204
here two cases are differentiated, i.e., secrecy outage caused205
by any Eve conditioned on CB ≥ RB and data outage given206
by CB < RB . In the latter case, it is typical outage with no207
secrecy and thus no secrecy outage. Therefore, the data outage208
is not part of the secrecy outage and is beyond the scope of209
this paper. In practice, Bob can transmit a one bit feedback to210
Alice indicating whether the condition CB ≥ RB is satisfied.211
The ER, denoted by 
, is defined by the geometric region212
only where Eves cause the secrecy outage event, i.e., CEi >213
RB − Rs , ∃zEi ∈ 
 conditioned on CB ≥ RB . The boundary214
of ER can be derived from C(z) > RB − Rs and is given215
by D(θ) = (c0 Pt |h˜|2)1/β , where c0 = [σ 2n (2RB−RS − 1)]−1216
is deterministic and is assumed to be constant in this paper.217
Thus, D(θ) is random as |h˜|2 varies. When the channel is218
deterministic, D(θ) is also deterministic, as shown by the219
dashed curve in Fig. 1.220
Let A denote the size of 
. For PPP-distributed Eves, the221
probability of m Eves being inside D(θ) can be given by [27]222
Prob{m Eves in 
} = (λe A)
m
m! e
−λe A. (6)223
Thus, the SSOP, denoted by p, can be defined by the proba- 224
bility that any Eve is located inside D(θ). 225
p = 1 − Prob{0 Eve in 
} = 1 − e−λe A. (7) 226
Note that p is computed by the complementary of the prob- 227
ability that no Eve is inside 
. In polar coordinates, (7) can 228
be derived by 229
p = 1 − exp
[
− λe
2
c
2
β
0 P
2
β
t
∫ 2π
0
(|h˜|2) 2β dθ
]
. (8) 230
The smaller p is, the more secure the transmission to Bob is. 231
Due to the fact that h˜ is random channel fading, it is more 232
interesting to study the expectation of p in (8), which reflects 233
the averaged SSOP p¯, 234
p¯ = E|h˜|[p]. (9) 235
The term p¯ in (9) can be expressed by 236
p¯ = 1 −
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
−∞
exp
{
− λe
2
c
2
β
0 P
2
β
t
∫ 2π
0
[ K G2(θ, θB)
K + 1 237
+ x
2 + y2
K + 1 +
2
√
K G(θ, θB)
K + 1 x
] 2
β dθ
}e−(x2+y2)
π
dx dy, 238
(10) 239
Notice that G(θ, θB) is a general array factor expression. For 240
the UCA, p and p¯ are obtained by substituting (4) into (8) 241
and (10). 242
C. An Optimization Problem 243
The focus of this paper is to increase the security level of 244
the transmission from Alice to Bob, i.e., reducing p¯. To this 245
end, p¯ is first analyzed against the factors in (10). Assume that 246
the noise variance σ 2n , channel factors β and K , the security 247
related parameters RB and Rs and the density of Eves λe are 248
fixed. The remaining factors are the transmit power Pt , the 249
array factor G(θ, θB) and Bob’s location (dB, θB). Thus, an 250
optimization problem can be expressed by 251
min p¯ s.t. for all dB, θB (11) 252
To minimize p¯, the interrelationship between parameters 253
related to Alice, i.e., Pt and G(θ, θB), and Bob’s location 254
(dB, θB) should be analyzed. Note that dB does not appear 255
in (10) and Pt has a monotonic relationship with p¯. In addition, 256
the impact of Pt and G(θ, θB) on p¯ are independent according 257
to (10). In this paper, when studying the impact of G(θ, θB), 258
Pt and dB will be not be included. 259
G(θ, θB) in (4) depends on the array parameters N and 260
R as well as Bob’s angle θB . As the number of antennas N 261
is normally fixed for a certain UCA, the impact of R will 262
be mainly discussed against θB . Due to the reflection and 263
rotation symmetry of the UCA, the shape of G(θ, θB) also has 264
reflection and rotation symmetry regarding θB . An example 265
of G(θ, θB) with θB = 0, π4 and N = 8 is shown in Fig. 2. 266
As the first element of the UCA lies on the positive x-axis, the 267
shape of G(θ, θB) for θB = π4 can be obtained by shifting the 268
shape for θB = 0 by π4 , and vice versa. At the same time, 269
the two shapes are symmetric regarding to θB = π8 . In general, 270
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Fig. 2. G(θ, θB ) for θB = 0 and θB = π4 . N = 8 and R = 0.8λ.
G(θ, θB) at ±(θB ± 2π/N) are of the same shape. Therefore,271
it suffices to study G(θ, θB) only in θB ∈ [0, πN ] instead of272 [0, 2π].273
The expression of p¯ in (10) is complex and can be calculated274
numerically. However, it is not tractable to obtain in closed-275
form expression, except for the deterministic channel when276
β = 2. Therefore, an upper bound expression for p¯, denoted277
by p¯up, should be derived in closed-form for UCA in order278
to facilitate detailed theoretical analysis. Notice that for other279
array types, the method of analyzing p¯ via closed-from expres-280
sion of p¯up still works. If closed-form expressions of p¯up do281
not exist, appropriate approximations or numerical results can282
be used based on the particular form of given G(θ, θB).283
III. CLOSED-FORM EXPRESSION FOR284
THE UPPER BOUND FOR SSOP285
A. Derivation of the Upper Bound for UCA286
Firstly, a general upper bound is briefly introduced as287
follows, based on which the particular upper bound for UCA288
can be derived. For a given λe and K , p¯up can be derived289
using Jensen’s inequality.290
p¯up = 1 − exp
{
− λeπ
[
c0 Pt
K A0 + 2π
2π(K + 1)
] 2
β
}
, (12)291
where A0 denotes the pattern area and is given by,292
A0 =
∫ 2π
0
G2(θ, θB) dθ. (13)293
The derivation is described in [19]. According to (12), p¯up is294
monotonically increasing with A0 for any K and β. Therefore,295
p¯up can be analyzed via A0.296
Notice that the expression of A0 in (13) contains G(θ, θB)297
which is a general expression. To obtain the particular expres-298
sion for the UCA, the expression of A0 needs to be determined.299
We can isolate θ to solve the integral in (4).300
G2(θ, θB) = 1N
∑
i, j
e jk R[cos(θB−ψi )−cos(θB−ψ j )]301
·e− j k R[cos(θ−ψi )−cos(θ−ψ j )], (14)302
where
∑
i, j represents
∑N
i=1
∑N
j=1 and cos(θ − ψi )− 303
cos(θ − ψ j ) can be further derived by 304
cos(θ−ψi)−cos(θ−ψ j ) = 2 sin(θ− i + j −2N π) sin(
i − j
N
π). 305
(15) 306
Let Wi, j = 2 sin( i− jN π) and Zi, j = i+ j−2N π . Substituting (15) 307
into (14), G2(θ, θB) can be derived as 308
1
N
∑
i, j
e jk RWi, j sin(θB−Zi, j ) · e− j k RWi, j sin(θ−Zi, j ). (16) 309
According to Jn(x) = 12π
∫ π
−π e j (nτ−x sin τ )dτ , where Jn(x) is 310
the Bessel function of the first kind with order n, the following 311
integration can be derived. 312
∫ 2π
0
e− j k RWi, j sin(θ−Zi, j ) dθ 313
=
∫ 2π−Zi, j
−Zi, j
e j [0·τ−k RWi, j sin τ ] d(τ + Zi, j ) 314
=
∫ π
−π
e j [0·θ−k RWi, j sin τ ] dτ = 2π J0(k RWi, j ) (17) 315
Note that in the second step, the upper and lower limits can be 316
transformed to π and −π , because sin τ is a periodic function 317
with a period of 2π . 318
Combining (16) and (17), A0 in (13) can be written as 319
A0 = 2πN
∑
i, j
J0(k RWi, j )e jk RWi, j sin(θB−Zi, j ). (18) 320
The double summation of Bessel functions in (18) is 321
intractable to analyze. In the following, A0 will be further 322
simplified. Let A0,i, j denote each summation term in (18), 323
A0,i, j = 2πN J0(k RWi, j )e
jk RWi, j sin(θB−Zi, j ). (19) 324
It is deduced that Wi, j = −W j,i and Zi, j = Z j,i . Considering 325
that Jn(−x) = (−1)n Jn(x) and J0(x) is a real number, it can 326
be deduced that A0,i, j = A∗0, j,i . In addition, it can be shown 327
from the expression of Wi, j and Zi, j that Wi, j+N = −Wi, j . 328
Similarly, sin(θB − Zi, j+N ) = − sin(θB − Zi, j ). Thus, it can 329
be determined found that A0,i, j = A0,i, j+N . 330
A table of A0,i, j is shown in Fig. 3 to illustrate how to 331
use the previous properties to simplify the summation of A0 332
in (18). For N = 4, the table is extended to j = 8. As A0,i, j = 333
A0,i, j+N , the blue region is equivalent to the green region. 334
Instead of adding Ai, j for i, j from 1 to N , the summation 335
can now be executed diagonally. For convenience, let n = i− j . 336
Then, Wn = Wi, j = 2 sin( nN π). The terms A0,i, j on the red 337
diagonal lines in the table have the same Wn . In the table, 338
N
π Zi, j is allocated according to their indices i and j . Given 339
n = i − j , it can be derived that 340
Zn,i = Zi, j = i + j − 2N π =
2i − n − 2
N
π. (20) 341
Thus, it can be derived that 342
A0,n,i = A0,i, j = 2πN J0(k RWn)e
jk RWn sin(θB−Zn,i ). (21) 343
344
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Fig. 3. Table for Zi, j , N = 4.
A0 is the summation of all elements in the original table345
(i.e., i, j = 1, . . . , 4). Because A0,i, j+N = A0,i, j , the calcula-346
tion of A0 can be executed by replacing the lower triangle in347
the original table (i.e., i > j ) with the lower triangle in the348
extended table (i.e., i > j − N). In the new formation of A0,349
which is a parallelogram table, the summation can be carried350
out along the diagonal lines from n = 0 to n = −(N −1). For351
any n, the summation of A0,n,i includes N terms with Zn,i .352
Thus, (18) can be converted into353
A0 =
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
A0,i, j =
−(N−1)∑
n=0
N∑
i=1
A0,n,i354
=
−(N−1)∑
n=0
N∑
i=1
2π
N
J0(k RWn)e jk RWn sin(θB−Zn,i )355
= 2π
N
−(N−1)∑
n=0
J0(k RWn)
N∑
i=1
e jk RWn sin(θB−Zn,i ). (22)356
According to Jacobi-Anger expansion e jα sin γ =357 ∑∞
m=−∞ Jm(α)e jmγ , (22) can be further derived by (23) at358
the bottom of the following page.359
When m = l N , l ∈ Z, e jπ mN (n+2) = e jlnπe j2πl = e jlnπ and360
N∑
i=1
e− j2π
m
N i =
N∑
i=1
e− j2πli = N. (24)361
When m = l N ,362
N∑
i=1
e− j2π
m
N i = e− j2π mN 1 − e
− j2π mN N
1 − e− j2π mN = 0. (25)363
Thus, it can be derived that364
A0 = 2πN
−(N−1)∑
n=0
J0(k RWn)
∞∑
l=−∞
JlN (k RWn)e jlNθB e jlnπ N365
= 2π
−(N−1)∑
n=0
J0(k RWn)
∞∑
l=−∞
JlN (k RWn)e jlNθB (−1)ln366
= 2π
N−1∑
n=0
J0(−k RWn)
∞∑
l=−∞
(−1)−ln JlN (−k RWn)e jlNθB367
= 2π
N−1∑
n=0
J0(k RWn)
∞∑
l=−∞
(−1)ln+lN JlN (k RWn)e jlNθB .368
(26)369
Fig. 4. Upper plot: Examples of J0(k RWn) versus R. Lower plot:
A0 versus R. N = 8, θB = 0°.
Substituting (26) in (13), the closed-form expression for p¯up 370
in (12) can be obtained. Compared to (13), the expression 371
of A0 in (26) consists of a finite summation of J0(·) and an 372
infinite summation of JlN (·), which can provide asymptotic 373
analysis. 374
B. Impact of R on A0 375
As discussed in Section II-C, the impact of R will be used 376
as a starting point to formulate the optimization problem. 377
In the low region of x , the Bessel function JlN (x) in (26) 378
is negligible for high order l N , i.e., l N  1. Let x0 denote 379
the upper limit of the range x ∈ [0, x0] where JlN (x) is 380
negligible for certain l N . Then, the specific value x0 depends 381
on the order l N . As the order l N increases, x0 increases and 382
eventually exceeds the value of 2k R, which is the upper limit 383
of x = K RWn in (26) for a fixed R. Once x0 becomes larger 384
than 2k R, all JlN (x) for l ≥ 1 are negligible in the range 385
(0, 2k R]. Thus, for sufficiently large N , A0 in (26) can be 386
approximated by 387
A0 ≈ 2π
N−1∑
n=0
J 20 (k RWn). (27) 388
The asymptotic behavior of A0 versus R can be analyzed 389
through (27). As shown in the upper plot in Fig. 4, when 390
n = 0, J0(k RW0) = 1, because W0 = 0 and J0(0) is a 391
constant that is irrelevant to R. When n = 0, J0(k RWn) 392
gradually decreases with some fluctuation as R increases, 393
which is determined by the nature of J0(·). Notice that in the 394
asymptotic expression in (27), the angle θB is neglected. When 395
N is not large enough, the term JlN (k RWn)e jlNθB also needs 396
to be considered. As Jn(x) decreases and approaches zero 397
with different convergence speed, the summation of a series of 398
Bessel functions, i.e., A0, in general decreases and approaches 399
a certain value as R increases. Due to the difference in the 400
converging speed of JlN (k RWn), there are some fluctuations. 401
An example of A0 versus R is shown in the lower plot 402
in Fig. 4 where N = 8 and θB = 0°. It can be seen 403
that A0 fluctuates as R increases, because the curve is a 404
superposition of JlN (k RWn) with different orders l N . Thus, 405
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Fig. 5. p¯ versus R for different values of θB , N = 8, Pt/σ 2n = 15 dB,
RB = 3.4594 bps/Hz, Rs = 1 bps/Hz, λe = 1 × 10−4.
in a local region, e.g., R < 2λ, the minimum value does not406
necessarily correspond to a large or small R, which leads to407
the optimization problem for R.408
IV. OPTIMIZATION ALGORITHM409
A. Refined Optimization Problem410
As mentioned in Section III-B, R can be properly designed411
according to θB to achieve a local minimum value in a certain412
range of R. According to Section II-C, dB is not involved in413
the expression of p¯. Thus, the optimization problem can be414
solved by optimizing R according to θB .415
It is worth noticing that although the closed-form expression416
of p¯up provides an asymptotic analysis on the impact of R,417
it does not provide accurate results for the optimum value418
for R. As it is intractable to analyze the expression of p¯ in (10),419
we will use numerical results to determine this.420
Examples of p¯ versus R for different θB are shown in Fig. 5421
where N = 8. For simplicity, let K → ∞ and β = 2, i.e., the422
channel is degraded to a free-space channel. More results for423
Rician fading channel will be provided in Section V-A. For the424
purpose of MATLAB simulation, the value of R is taken by425
a step of 1 cm in the range [0.4λ, 2λ]. Typical values of θB ,426
i.e., θB = 0°, 10°, 20°, are taken for the UCA with N = 8.427
Fig. 5 depicts the fluctuating behavior of p¯ with respect to R428
for different values of θB . It can be seen that the curves for429
different θB vary. Therefore, for each θB , the local minimum430
of p¯ in the range R ∈ [0.4λ, 2λ] is given by a different value431
of R. This suggests that by varying θB , a different R should432
be chosen in order to achieve a minimum p¯. However, this is433
not practical because R is usually predefined for an existing 434
UCA. 435
Since R can only be a particular value, the optimum value 436
Ropt needs to pre-designed. To this end, the minimum mean 437
error is used to find Ropt in a certain range of R that produces 438
the minimum p¯ for all possible θB ∼ U(0, 2π). To establish 439
the cost function, imagine that R is adjustable, which provides 440
the hypothetical function of p¯min with respect to θB . Notice 441
that the value of p¯min for each θB is, in fact, given by a 442
different value of R. To find Ropt , let the mean error, denoted 443
by err(R), be the mean value of the difference between p¯ and 444
p¯min over the range θB ∈ [0, 2π], 445
err(R) = EθB [ p¯ − p¯min]. (28) 446
Note that the mean error is used instead of the mean square 447
error because p¯− p¯min is always non-negative. Thus, Ropt can 448
be found by 449
Ropt = arg min
R
err(R). (29) 450
(29) can be converted into the following expression, the 451
derivation of which is in Appendix A. 452
Ropt = arg min
R
¯¯p, (30) 453
where ¯¯p is the averaged p¯ over Bob’s angles and is defined by 454
¯¯p = 1
2π
∫ 2π
0
p¯ dθB . (31) 455
B. Analysis and Implementation of Optimization Algorithm 456
Substituting the expression of p¯ in (10) into (31), the 457
expression of ¯¯p can be obtained, 458
¯¯p = 1 − 1
2π
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ 2π
0
exp
{
− λe
2
(c0 Pt )
2
β 459
×
∫ 2π
0
[ K G2C(θ, θB)
K + 1 +
x2 + y2
K + 1 460
+ 2
√
K GC(θ, θB)
K + 1 x
] 2
β dθ
}e−(x2+y2)
π
dθB dx dy. (32) 461
Although (32) can be numerically calculated, it is intractable 462
to analyze. Thus, the upper bound, denoted by ¯¯pup, is required 463
for theoretical analysis. 464
Theorem 1: 465
¯¯pup = 1 − exp
{
− λeπ
[ c0 K A¯0
2π(K + 1) +
c0
K + 1
] 2
β
}
, (33) 466
where A¯0 is the expectation of A0 over θB and is given by 467
A¯0 = 12π
∫ 2π
0
A0 dθB = 2π
N−1∑
n=0
J 20 (k RWn). (34) 468
A0 = 2πN
−(N−1)∑
n=0
J0(k RWn)
N∑
i=1
∞∑
m=−∞
Jm(k RWn)e jm(θB−Zn,i ) = 2πN
−(N−1)∑
n=0
J0(k RWn)
∞∑
m=−∞
Jm(k RWn)e jmθB
N∑
i=1
e− jm Zn,i
= 2π
N
−(N−1)∑
n=0
J0(k RWn)
∞∑
m=−∞
Jm(k RWn)e jmθB e jπ
m
N (n+2)
N∑
i=1
e− j2π
m
N i . (23)
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Fig. 6. ¯¯p versus R for all θB , N = 8, Pt/σ 2n = 15 dB, RB = 3.4594 bps/Hz,
Rs = 1 bps/Hz, λe = 1 × 10−4.
The proof of Theorem 1 is given in Appendix B. It can be seen469
that (34) has a similar composition to A0 in (26). Therefore,470
A¯0 in general decreases with some fluctuations as R increases.471
Due to the monotonically increasing relationship between ¯¯pup472
and A¯0, it can be deduced that ¯¯p decreases in general with473
some fluctuations as R increases.474
Because ¯¯p fluctuates in a certain range of R, there must475
exist at least one local minimum. Numerical results are used476
to find Ropt in (30). For example, choosing N = 8 and477
R ∈ [0.4λ, 2λ], the results of ¯¯p shown in Fig. 6 are obtained478
where the channel is chosen as a free-space channel. It can479
be seen that there is more than one local minimum. In the480
range R ∈ [0.4λ, 2λ], Ropt = 1.76λ gives the minimum ¯¯p481
as 2.4 × 10−3. Compared to the maximum value of ¯¯p that is482
3.6 × 10−3 in the same range, there is a 33% reduction in483
the value of ¯¯p. This indicates that by choosing an appropriate484
value of R, the averaged SSOP can be dramatically reduced.485
The numerical implementation of the algorithm is shown in486
Algorithm 1. The continuous ranges of R, θB , θ are discretized487
with steps of R, θB and θ , respectively. In addition,488
a limit value Q is used when calculating integral from −∞489
to ∞ in (32). For a normal distribution, a realistic value is set490
for Q, namely 3. Let NR , NθB , Nθ and NQ be the number of491
samples for R, θB , θ and the integration range Q respectively,492
which determines the iteration numbers.493
There are two main steps in the optimization algorithm.494
The first step is from line 3 to 15, where ¯¯p for a range of495
discretized R is calculated. Notice that the integrals in (32)496
are implemented via iterated summation from line 6 to 15. The497
second step section is from line 16 to 21, where the minimum498
value ¯¯pmin in the vector ¯¯p is searched to find Ropt which is499
the output of the optimization algorithm.500
The accuracy of the result increases with number of sam-501
ples; however, the compuational complexity also increases.502
The running time of the numerical implementation is approxi-503
mately O(NR NθB N2Q Nθ ). There is no specific restriction on the504
sampling interval as long as the chosen resolution generates a505
reasonable value.506
Algorithm 1 Optimization of R for Fixed N .
INPUT: σ 2n , β, K , RB , Rs , λe, λ, Pt , N
INPUT: R1, R2, R; θB1, θB2, θB ; θ1, θ2, θ ; Q, Q
OUTPUT: Ropt
1: discretize R, θB , θ , Q
2: calculate NR , NθB , Nθ , NQ and c0
3: create an 1 × NR empty vector of ¯¯p with index idx
4: for each value of R ∈ [R1, R2], θB ∈ [θB1, θB2] do
5: S1 = 0
6: for each value of x, y ∈ [−Q, Q] do
7: S2 = 0
8: for each value of θ ∈ [θ1, θ2] do
9: S2 = S2+
10:
[
K G2(θ,θB)+x2+y2+2
√
K G(θ,θB)x
K+1
] 2
β
θ
11: end for
12: S1 = S1 + exp{−λe2 (Pt c0)
2
β S2} e−(x
2+y2)
π Q2
13: end for
14: ¯¯p(idx) = ¯¯p(idx) + (1 − S1)/NθB
15: end for
16: initialization: Ropt = R1, ¯¯pmin = ¯¯p(1)
17: for each value of R ∈ [R1, R2] do
18: if ¯¯pmin > ¯¯p(idx) then
19: reassignment: Ropt = R, ¯¯pmin = ¯¯p(idx)
20: end if
21: end for
V. SIMULATION AND NUMERICAL RESULTS 507
In this section, we first provide simulation results for p¯ 508
in (10) and then numerical results for ¯¯p in (32) over the Rician 509
channel with a wider range of values of K and β. Next, the 510
numerical results of the upper bounds p¯up and ¯¯pup are shown 511
in comparison with p¯ and ¯¯p to demonstrate the validity of the 512
upper bounds. In the end, we investigate a common problem 513
in antenna array, i.e., the mutual coupling and its effect on p¯. 514
A. More Results for Rician Fading Channels 515
In Section IV-B, numerical results are used to show the 516
properties of p¯ versus R. Firstly, the simulation results are 517
provided to validate the expressions of p¯ in (10) that is derived 518
from the expression in (9) which contains Gaussian random 519
variables via |h˜2| according to (3). We choose K = 10 and 520
β = 3 as an example to compare the numerical results based 521
on the expression in (10) and the simulation results based 522
on the expression in (9). We ran Monte Carlo simulations to 523
generate 1 × 104 samples of gRe and gI m in (3). As stated in 524
Section II-C, the noise variance σ 2n , channel factors β and K , 525
the security related parameters RB and Rs and the density 526
of Eves λe are assumed to be constant; the transmit power 527
Pt does not affect the impact of the array parameters to the 528
SSOP. In this section, Pt and σ 2n are set to −65 dBm and 529
−80 dBm, respectively. The rate of the transmitted codewords 530
RB is set to 3.4594 bps/Hz which corresponds to a received 531
SNR of 10 dB for Bob. The rate of the confidential information 532
Rs is set to be smaller than RB , e.g., 1 bps/Hz as used in [18]. 533
The density of Eves is set to 1×10−4 which means 100 Eves 534
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Fig. 7. Simulation and numerical results for p¯ versus R; K = 10,
β = 3, θB = 0° Pt/σ 2n = 15 dB, RB = 3.4594 bps/Hz, Rs = 1 bps/Hz,
λe = 1 × 10−4.
Fig. 8. Numerical results for ¯¯p versus R; Pt/σ 2n = 15 dB,
RB = 3.4594 bps/Hz, Rs = 1 bps/Hz, λe = 1 × 10−4.
in 1000 × 1000 m2. Finally, the radius of the UCA is set535
to [0.4λ, 2λ], which corresponds to [5, 25] cm for 2.4 GHz536
frequency. For comparison, a commercial uniform circular537
array FCI-3710 developed by Fidelity Comtech has 15.24 cm538
radius [29]. The simulation and numerical results plotted in539
Fig. 7 show a good match between them, which verifies the540
validity of the expressions in (10).541
Secondly, a wider range of K and β for Rician channel542
will be examined. We choose typical value of β = 3, 5 and543
K = 1, 10. The results of ¯¯p is calculated according to (32). As544
shown in Fig. 8, all curves exhibit similar trend with regard to545
R to the curve in Fig. 6 where K → ∞ and β = 2. In addition,546
for both curves in Fig. 8, the optimum value Ropt in the range547
R ∈ [0.4λ, 2λ] is 1.76λ. It means that the optimum value of548
R in a certain range is valid for Rician channels with different549
K and β.550
B. Numerical Results of the Upper Bounds551
Next, closed-form expressions of p¯up and ¯¯pup are derived552
in Section III-A and Section IV-B, respectively, in order to553
facilitate analysis. Here, some numerical results are shown to554
Fig. 9. Numerical results for p¯ and p¯up versus R; β = 3, Pt/σ 2n = 15 dB,
RB = 3.4594 bps/Hz, Rs = 1 bps/Hz, λe = 1 × 10−4.
Fig. 10. Numerical results for ¯¯p and ¯¯pup versus R; β = 3, Pt/σ 2n = 15 dB,
RB = 3.4594 bps/Hz, Rs = 1 bps/Hz, λe = 1 × 10−4.
demonstrate that the upper bounds can reflect the fluctuating 555
behavior of p¯ and ¯¯p against R. 556
In Fig. 9, the results for p¯ and p¯up versus R are shown for 557
typical values of β = 3 and K = 1, 10. It can be seen that 558
the curves of p¯up have a similar shape to the curves of p¯, and 559
the value of p¯up is close to p¯up. This suggests that the upper 560
bound can very well reflect the property of p¯. 561
In Fig. 10, the results for ¯¯p and ¯¯pup versus R are shown for 562
typical values of β = 3 and K = 1, 10. It can be seen that the 563
curves for ¯¯p and ¯¯pup have a similar shape, and the values of 564¯¯p and ¯¯pup are close to each other, which means that ¯¯pup is a 565
good upper bound. 566
C. Impact of Mutual Coupling 567
The mutual coupling is caused by energy absorption 568
between proximate antennas and causes distortion to the array 569
factor G(θ, θB), and thus affects p¯ and the optimization 570
algorithm. In this paper, we choose the NEC tool [26] to build 571
a numerical model as an example to examine the impact of 572
the mutual coupling, although any analytical model will apply. 573
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Fig. 11. Example of theoretical and NEC simulated patterns, N = 8,
R = 0.8λ, θB = 0°.
The NEC tool serves as a numerical method to calculate array574
patterns that include the mutual coupling effect, and its results575
are well accepted in the literature [30], [31].576
An example shown in Fig. 11 illustrates the difference577
caused by the mutual coupling for system configurations with578
N = 8, R = 0.8λ, θB = 0°. The array pattern with the mutual579
coupling is calculated by the NEC simulation. It can be seen580
that there is not much difference in the main beam, but with581
deviation in the sidelobes.582
To measure the array pattern distortion caused by the mutual583
coupling, Pearson’s correlation coefficient, denoted by ρ,584
is adopted. It measures the correlation between two variables585
X and Y , as defined by586
ρ = cov(X, Y )
std(X) · std(Y ) , (35)587
where cov(·, ·) stands for the covariance and std(·) the stan-588
dard deviation. ρ between the theoretical array pattern and589
the simulated array pattern via NEC tool can be calculated to590
quantify their similarity. The larger ρ is, the more alike two591
patterns are.592
The patterns of the UCA with a range of radius are593
simulated in NEC. For N = 8, typical values are chosen, i.e.,594
θB = 0°, 10°, 20° in the range R = [0.4λ, 2λ]. The correlation595
coefficient, ρ, between the theoretical and NEC patterns is596
calculated and the results are shown in Fig. 12. It can be seen597
that ρ is generally above 0.8 in the range of R = [0.4λ, 2λ],598
except for R = 0.48λ. This shows that the mutual coupling599
does not cause a significant distortion to the pattern of UCA.600
The high correlation between the theoretical and NEC patterns601
indicates that the optimization algorithm, which is based on602
empirical results on the theoretical patterns, can still work603
when considering the mutual coupling.604
On the other hand, there exists some differences between the605
theoretical and NEC patterns, which means that when calculat-606
ing Ropt in the numerical implementation of the optimization607
algorithm, the NEC simulation data instead of the theoretical608
data should be used. To compare with Fig. 5, the same array609
parameters are adopted, i.e., N = 8 and R ∈ [0.4λ, 2λ],610
Fig. 12. Correlation coefficients between theoretical and NEC simulated
patterns, N = 8, Pt/σ 2n = 15 dB, RB = 3.4594 bps/Hz, Rs = 1 bps/Hz,
λe = 1 × 10−4.
Fig. 13. Upper plot: p¯ versus R. Lower plot: ¯¯p versus R. N = 8,
Pt/σ 2n = 15 dB, RB = 3.4594 bps/Hz, Rs = 1 bps/Hz, λe = 1 × 10−4.
and p¯ with the mutual coupling is calculated based on the 611
NEC simulation data. The results are shown in the upper 612
plot in Fig. 13. Compared to Fig. 5, it is not hard to notice 613
the similarity between the theoretical and NEC simulated 614
curves for the same θB , which can be explained by the high 615
correlation between them, as shown in Fig. 12. 616
Because of the differences between the theoretical and 617
NEC simulated results, ¯¯p in Fig. 6 needs to be re-calculated 618
based on the NEC simulation data, in order to find Ropt . The 619
lower plot in Fig. 13 shows ¯¯p based on the NEC simulation 620
data in comparison with the theoretical curve. It can be 621
seen that the optimum value for the NEC simulation data is 622
Ropt = 1.6λ compared to Ropt = 1.76λ for the theoretical 623
result. By choosing Ropt = 1.6λ, the value of ¯¯p is reduced 624
dramatically by about 59% compared to the maximum value 625
of ¯¯p at R = 0.4λ. 626
VI. CONCLUSIONS 627
This paper investigated the security performance of 628
ER-based beamforming system with the UCA in the presence 629
of PPP distributed Eves in Rician fading channel. With the aid 630
IEE
E P
ro
of
10 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON COMMUNICATIONS
of the expression of the averaged SSOP and the closed-form631
expression of its upper bound, an optimization algorithm with632
regard to the radius was developed to minimize the SSOP.633
This paper provides a mathematical relationship which allows634
the radius to be optimized for a given UCA with a certain635
number of elements. The optimization algorithm is still valid636
for mutual coupling in practice, however, the optimum value637
needs to be calculated based on the NEC simulation data. In638
this work, it is assumed that Bob’s location is known by Alice639
beforehand. In practice, there could be inaccuracy in Bob’s640
location information at Alice, whether Bob sends his location641
to Alice or Alice estimates Bob’s location. In future work,642
it can be extended to include the impact of error in Bob’s643
location when optimizing the array parameters in practice. We644
will also extend our work considering random locations of645
Bob.646
APPENDIX A647
CONVERSION OF OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM648
Because θB ∼ U(0, 2π), err(R) can be calculated by649
err(R) = 1
2π
∫ 2π
0
( p¯ − p¯min) dθB. (36)650
To find the minimum value of err(R), the zeros of the partial651
derivative of err(R) with respect to R are calculated,652
∂
∂ R
err(R) = 0 (37)653
⇒ ∂
∂ R
1
2π
∫ 2π
0
( p¯ − p¯min) dθB = 0 (38)654
⇒ 1
2π
∫ 2π
0
(
∂
∂ R
p¯ − ∂
∂ R
p¯min) dθB = 0. (39)655
Because p¯min is a fixed value for certain θB and only depends656
on θB , the partial derivative ∂∂ R p¯min = 0. Thus, it can be657
derived that658
∂
∂ R
err(R) = 0 (40)659
⇒ 1
2π
∫ 2π
0
∂
∂ R
p¯ dθB = 0 (41)660
⇒ ∂
∂ R
1
2π
∫ 2π
0
p¯ dθB = 0 (42)661
⇒ ∂
∂ R
¯¯p = 0, (43)662
where ¯¯p is the averaged SSOP over Bob’s angle and is663
defined by664
¯¯p = 1
2π
∫ 2π
0
p¯ dθB. (44)665
Thus, we can obtain666
Ropt = arg min
R
¯¯p. (45)667
APPENDIX B 668
PROOF OF THEOREM 1 669
To obtain the upper bound ¯¯pup, two instances of Jensen’s 670
inequality will be used to derive p¯up. 671
E[eX ] ≥ eE[X ], (46) 672
where X is a random variable. The equality holds if and 673
only if X is a deterministic value. The other one involved 674
is expressed by 675
E[X 2β ] ≤ (E[X]) 2β , (47) 676
where X is a random variable and β ≥ 2. The equality holds 677
when β = 2 for any X . 678
The upper bound ¯¯pup can be derived based on p¯ ≤ p¯up. 679
Using (12), it can be derived that 680
¯¯p = EθB [ p¯] ≤ EθB [ p¯up] 681
= 1 − EθB
[
exp
{
−λeπ
[ c0 K
2π(K +1) A0+
c0
K +1
] 2
β
}]
. (48) 682
Using (46) and (47), it can be derived that 683
1 − EθB
[
exp
{
− λeπ
[ c0 K
2π(K + 1) A0 +
c0
K + 1
] 2
β
}]
(49) 684
< 1 − exp
{
−λeπEθB
[[ c0 K
2π(K +1) A0+
c0
K +1
] 2
β
]}
(50) 685
≤ 1 − exp
{
−λeπ
[ c0 K
2π(K +1)EθB [A0]+
c0
K +1
] 2
β
}
. (51) 686
The equality in (50) does not hold because θB is random in 687
this case. Then, ¯¯pup can be obtained by 688
¯¯pup = 1 − exp
{
− λeπ
[ c0 K A¯0
2π(K + 1) +
c0
K + 1
] 2
β
}
, (52) 689
where A¯0 is the expectation of A0 over θB and is given by 690
A¯0 = EθB [A0] =
1
2π
∫ 2π
0
A0 dθB. (53) 691
The above equation can be calculated from (26) by directly 692
solving the integral. Because 693
∫ 2π
0
e jlNθB dθB = 0, for l = 0 (54) 694
it can be obtained that 695
A¯0 = 2π
N−1∑
n=0
J 20 (2k R sin(
n
N
π)). (55) 696
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Security Optimization of Exposure Region-Based
Beamforming With a Uniform Circular Array
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Abstract— This paper investigates the impact of a uniform cir-AQ:1 1
cular array (UCA) in the context of wireless security via exposure2
region-based beamforming. An improvement is demonstrated for3
the security metric proposed in our previous paper, namely,4
the spatial secrecy outage probability (SSOP), by optimizing5
the configuration of the UCA. Our previous paper focused on6
formalizing the SSOP concept and exploring its applicability7
using a uniform linear array example. This paper proposes the8
UCA as a superior candidate because it is more robust against9
the effects of mutual coupling. The UCA’s SSOP configuration10
is explored and a special expression is derived from the general11
expression for the first time, and a closed-form upper bound is12
then generated to facilitate analysis. By carefully designing the13
UCA structure particularly the radius, an SSOP optimization14
algorithm is derived and explored for mutual coupling. It is15
shown that the information leakage to eavesdroppers is reduced16
while the legitimate user’s received signal quality is enhanced17
due to the use of beamforming.18
Index Terms— Physical layer security, beamforming, exposure19
region, spatial secrecy outage probability, uniform circular array.20
I. INTRODUCTION21
W IRELESS communication is vulnerable to passive22 eavesdropping due to its broadcast nature. Physical23
layer security exploits the unique and unpredictable features24
of wireless channels such as fading and has shown a great25
potential to secure future wireless technologies [1], [2]. This26
technique dates back to Wyner’s seminal work on the wiretap27
channel model [3], which has triggered much fruitful research28
and has been extended to various channel models, such as29
fading channels and multiple antenna channels [4]–[7].30
In the physical layer security scenario with legitimate users31
wishing to carry out secure communication with eavesdroppers32
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observing the transmissions, the channel of the legitimate user 33
in Wyner’s wiretap channel model is required to be better than 34
that of the eavesdroppers, at least for a fraction of realizations 35
in the case of fading channels [4]. When the legitimate 36
transmitter is equipped with multiple antennas or an antenna 37
array, beamforming is an effective technique to enlarge the 38
difference of the legitimate users’ and eavesdroppers’ channel 39
quality and can be achieved by exploiting the channel state 40
information (CSI) [8] or the location information [9]. 41
Beamforming can be used to create physical regions within 42
which any user can correctly receive the message [10]–[13]; 43
the area was defined as an ‘exposure region’ (ER) in [10]. 44
However, these regions were not based on information- 45
theoretic parameters, such as secrecy capacity or secrecy 46
outage probability (SOP) [4], and thus lacked a quantitative 47
measure of the security level. On the other hand, some AQ:248
information theoretical based methods lacked of the analysis 49
from a physical perspective, for example, the aspect of antenna 50
arrays [14]–[18]. 51
In our previous work [19], we proposed an 52
ER-based beamforming approach which led to the derivation 53
of the spatial secrecy outage probability (SSOP) from an 54
information-theoretic perspective and links with the antenna 55
array configuration. Fig. 1 illustrates a transmitter (Alice) 56
with an antenna array that communicates to a legitimate 57
user (Bob) in the presence of eavesdroppers (Eves) with 58
their location distribution following a Poisson point process 59
(PPP); this hints towards the utilization of location in the 60
Wyner’s channel model. The ER is defined by the physical 61
region where any PPP distributed Eve causes secrecy outage 62
to the legitimate transmission in the Rician fading channel. 63
In [19], the secrecy outage caused by PPP distributed Eves is 64
quantitatively measured by the SSOP that is derived from the 65
ER. The general expression of the SSOP for any type of array 66
is derived and the uniform linear array (ULA) is used as an 67
example to explore the properties of the array parameters. 68
Based on the knowledge of the previous work, we advance 69
knowledge in this paper by optimizing the array parameters. 70
The uniform circular array (UCA) is chosen rather than 71
the ULA because of practical considerations, namely mutual 72
coupling. Mutual coupling is the electromagnetic interaction 73
between the antenna elements of an array and is always 74
associated with multiple antenna techniques [20], [21]. In [22], 75
it has been shown that linear arrays are susceptible to mutual 76
coupling, thus rendering no effective optimum solution for 77
0090-6778 © 2017 Crown Copyright
IEE
E P
ro
of
2 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON COMMUNICATIONS
Fig. 1. The enclosed area surrounding Bob illustrates the ER created using
a circular antenna array.
minimizing the SSOP. On the other hand, the UCA is less78
affected and produces a more symmetric beam pattern around79
360◦ [23]. Thus, it is chosen as the candidate to exhibit the80
optimization of the array parameters, especially the radius.81
We assume that Bob’s location information is available at
AQ:3
82
Alice, which is similar to that used in [9]. For example,83
Bob could send his own location information to Alice, if84
he wishes to be served by Alice with additional security85
features. Alice exploits Bob’s location information to perform86
the beamforming.87
In fading channels, the security performance of the afore-88
mentioned system, i.e., Alice using beamforming to enlarge89
the difference between Bob’s and Eves’ channels, can be90
expressed in terms of secrecy outage. In [24], the secrecy91
outage probability (SOP) for a single Eve is given by the92
probability that Eve’s channel capacity is higher than a certain93
threshold; this is defined by the difference between the rate94
of the transmitted codewords and that of the confidential95
information, conditioned on Bob’s channel capacity being96
larger than the rate of the transmitted codewords. In other97
words, the ER is an enclosed area within the boundary where98
Eve’s channel capacity is just equal to that threshold. As Eve’s99
channel capacity is random due to fading, the boundary of the100
ER shifts. In Fig. 1, the dashed curve depicts an ER boundary101
for a deterministic channel, which resembles the shape of the102
array pattern.103
Intuitively, the smaller the ER is, the less possible that104
Eves are located inside the ER, and therefore the more secure105
the transmission will be. The overall secrecy outage caused106
by PPP distributed Eves, i.e., SSOP, is calculated with the107
aid of stochastic geometry theory, which links the security108
performance with the UCA parameters. This paper builds109
substantially on our previous work [19], [25] by investigating110
the SSOP with respect to UCA parameters in Rician fading111
channel and creating an optimization algorithm which min-112
imizes the SSOP by adjusting the radius. In addition, the113
impact of mutual coupling is examined on the SSOP using114
a numerical simulation tool, i.e., NEC [26]. In essence, this115
sets the scene for setting secure regions in wireless networks.116
The main contributions of this paper are:117
• Deriving the expression of the SSOP for the UCA and118
the closed-form expression of its upper bound for the first119
time, thus revealing the relationship between the security120
performance and various parameters, especially the radius121
of the UCA.122
• Based on the expressions of the SSOP for the UCA,123
the first investigation of the security performance of124
ER-based beamforming for a Rician fading channel with 125
respect to radius is presented. Simulation and numerical 126
results are covered, which show how the behavior of 127
averaged SSOP varies with the radius. 128
• An optimization algorithm is derived based on the above 129
analysis, which enhances the security level by optimizing 130
the radius for all of Bob’s possible angles. The impact of 131
the mutual coupling with the radius is compared with 132
the optimization algorithm and shows that while the 133
algorithm in general is valid, the optimum value needs 134
to be calculated using numerical data. 135
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, 136
the system model is introduced and the definitions of the ER 137
and the SSOP are presented. In Section III, the closed-form 138
expression of the upper bound is derived and from this the 139
impact of the radius of the UCA is analyzed. In Section IV, the 140
optimization problem is established and analyzed with respect 141
to the UCA array parameters; an algorithm is then created with 142
the aim of decreasing the SSOP. In Section V, simulation and 143
numerical results are given. Section VI concludes the paper. 144
II. EXPOSURE REGION AND SPATIAL SECRECY 145
OUTAGE PROBABILITY 146
A. System Model 147
As the paper builds on [19], the system model is the same 148
except for the UCA aspect. For this reason, the essential 149
symbols, concepts and derivations for the UCA are described 150
briefly to avoid repetition. Let’s assume that Alice is equipped 151
with an antenna array while Bob and Eves have a single 152
antenna. As shown in Fig. 1, Alice is located at the origin 153
point. For convenience, assume that the first element of the 154
UCA is on the positive x-axis. The coordinate is denoted by 155
z = (d, θ), and subscripts B and Ei are used to represent 156
Bob and the i th Eve respectively, ∀i ∈ N+. A general user’s 157
location is referred to by z when no subscript is specified. 158
Eves are assumed to be non-colluding and distributed by a 159
homogeneous PPP, e with density λe [27]. 160
On the transmitter side, the UCA has N elements 161
and radius R, and the array vector of UCA is s(θ) = 162
[e− jφ1(θ), . . . , e− jφi (θ), . . . , e− jφN (θ)]T , θ ∈ [0, 2π], where 163
φi (θ) = k R cos(θ −ψi ), and ψi = 2π(i −1)/N is the angular 164
location of the i th element [28] and k = 2π/λ, where λ is 165
the wavelength of the carrier signal. Pt is the transmit power. 166
Given Bob’s location information, θB , the beamforming weight 167
vector can be set as w = s(θB)/
√
N . 168
Assume a Rician channel with factor K . The channel gain 169
vector is given by 170
h(z) = d−β/2(
√
K
K + 1s(θ) +
√
1
K + 1g
)
, (1) 171
where d−β/2 denotes the large-scale path loss with the path 172
loss exponent β of typical values between 2 and 6. The 173
line-of-sight (LOS) component is
√
K
K+1 s(θ); the non-LOS 174
component is
√
1
K+1 g, where g = [g1, . . . , gi , . . . , gN ]T , 175
gi ∼ CN (0, 1), and the elements of g are independent. 176
Thus, the received signal at z is the sum of the beamforming 177
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weighted signals and noise, which can be expressed by r(z) =178 √
Pt hT (z)w∗x + nW , where x is the modulated symbol with179
unit power and nW is the additive white Gaussian noise with180
zero mean and variance σ 2n .181
For the ease of subsequent mathematical derivations, let h˜182
be an equivalent channel factor, i.e.,183
h˜ = hT (z)w∗ =
√
K
K + 1 G(θ, θB) +
√
1
K + 1 g, (2)184
where G(θ, θB) = s(θ)s∗(θB)/
√
N is an array factor for any185
array type and g ∼ CN (0, 1). According to (2), |h˜|2 can be186
decomposed as follows:187
|h˜|2 = K G
2(θ, θB)
K + 1 +
g2Re+g2I m
K + 1 +
2
√
K G(θ, θB)
K + 1 gRe, (3)188
where gRe and gI m are the real and imaginary part of g,189
so, gRe, gI m ∼ N (0, 12 ). For the UCA, the array factor was190
derived in [28] and is given by191
G(θ, θB) = 1√
N
N∑
i=1
e jk R[cos(θB−ψi )−cos(θ−ψi )]. (4)192
The channel capacity, denoted by C(z), is given by193
C(z) = log2
(
1 + Pt |h˜|
2
σ 2n dβ
)
. (5)194
For convenience, let CB = C(zB) and CEi = C(zEi ) denote195
the channel capacities of Bob and the i th Eve hereinafter. Due196
to the fact that |h˜|2 scales with G(θ, θB), a proper design of197
G(θ, θB) can improve CB while decreasing CEi .198
B. Definitions for ER and SSOP for UCA199
As in [24], let RB and Rs be the rate of the transmitted code-200
words and the rate of the confidential information, respectively.201
A secrecy outage event occurs when Eve’s channel capacity is202
higher than the difference RB − Rs conditioned on CB ≥ RB ,203
and the probability of such an event is the SOP. Note that204
here two cases are differentiated, i.e., secrecy outage caused205
by any Eve conditioned on CB ≥ RB and data outage given206
by CB < RB . In the latter case, it is typical outage with no207
secrecy and thus no secrecy outage. Therefore, the data outage208
is not part of the secrecy outage and is beyond the scope of209
this paper. In practice, Bob can transmit a one bit feedback to210
Alice indicating whether the condition CB ≥ RB is satisfied.211
The ER, denoted by 
, is defined by the geometric region212
only where Eves cause the secrecy outage event, i.e., CEi >213
RB − Rs , ∃zEi ∈ 
 conditioned on CB ≥ RB . The boundary214
of ER can be derived from C(z) > RB − Rs and is given215
by D(θ) = (c0 Pt |h˜|2)1/β , where c0 = [σ 2n (2RB−RS − 1)]−1216
is deterministic and is assumed to be constant in this paper.217
Thus, D(θ) is random as |h˜|2 varies. When the channel is218
deterministic, D(θ) is also deterministic, as shown by the219
dashed curve in Fig. 1.220
Let A denote the size of 
. For PPP-distributed Eves, the221
probability of m Eves being inside D(θ) can be given by [27]222
Prob{m Eves in 
} = (λe A)
m
m! e
−λe A. (6)223
Thus, the SSOP, denoted by p, can be defined by the proba- 224
bility that any Eve is located inside D(θ). 225
p = 1 − Prob{0 Eve in 
} = 1 − e−λe A. (7) 226
Note that p is computed by the complementary of the prob- 227
ability that no Eve is inside 
. In polar coordinates, (7) can 228
be derived by 229
p = 1 − exp
[
− λe
2
c
2
β
0 P
2
β
t
∫ 2π
0
(|h˜|2) 2β dθ
]
. (8) 230
The smaller p is, the more secure the transmission to Bob is. 231
Due to the fact that h˜ is random channel fading, it is more 232
interesting to study the expectation of p in (8), which reflects 233
the averaged SSOP p¯, 234
p¯ = E|h˜|[p]. (9) 235
The term p¯ in (9) can be expressed by 236
p¯ = 1 −
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
−∞
exp
{
− λe
2
c
2
β
0 P
2
β
t
∫ 2π
0
[ K G2(θ, θB)
K + 1 237
+ x
2 + y2
K + 1 +
2
√
K G(θ, θB)
K + 1 x
] 2
β dθ
}e−(x2+y2)
π
dx dy, 238
(10) 239
Notice that G(θ, θB) is a general array factor expression. For 240
the UCA, p and p¯ are obtained by substituting (4) into (8) 241
and (10). 242
C. An Optimization Problem 243
The focus of this paper is to increase the security level of 244
the transmission from Alice to Bob, i.e., reducing p¯. To this 245
end, p¯ is first analyzed against the factors in (10). Assume that 246
the noise variance σ 2n , channel factors β and K , the security 247
related parameters RB and Rs and the density of Eves λe are 248
fixed. The remaining factors are the transmit power Pt , the 249
array factor G(θ, θB) and Bob’s location (dB, θB). Thus, an 250
optimization problem can be expressed by 251
min p¯ s.t. for all dB, θB (11) 252
To minimize p¯, the interrelationship between parameters 253
related to Alice, i.e., Pt and G(θ, θB), and Bob’s location 254
(dB, θB) should be analyzed. Note that dB does not appear 255
in (10) and Pt has a monotonic relationship with p¯. In addition, 256
the impact of Pt and G(θ, θB) on p¯ are independent according 257
to (10). In this paper, when studying the impact of G(θ, θB), 258
Pt and dB will be not be included. 259
G(θ, θB) in (4) depends on the array parameters N and 260
R as well as Bob’s angle θB . As the number of antennas N 261
is normally fixed for a certain UCA, the impact of R will 262
be mainly discussed against θB . Due to the reflection and 263
rotation symmetry of the UCA, the shape of G(θ, θB) also has 264
reflection and rotation symmetry regarding θB . An example 265
of G(θ, θB) with θB = 0, π4 and N = 8 is shown in Fig. 2. 266
As the first element of the UCA lies on the positive x-axis, the 267
shape of G(θ, θB) for θB = π4 can be obtained by shifting the 268
shape for θB = 0 by π4 , and vice versa. At the same time, 269
the two shapes are symmetric regarding to θB = π8 . In general, 270
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Fig. 2. G(θ, θB ) for θB = 0 and θB = π4 . N = 8 and R = 0.8λ.
G(θ, θB) at ±(θB ± 2π/N) are of the same shape. Therefore,271
it suffices to study G(θ, θB) only in θB ∈ [0, πN ] instead of272 [0, 2π].273
The expression of p¯ in (10) is complex and can be calculated274
numerically. However, it is not tractable to obtain in closed-275
form expression, except for the deterministic channel when276
β = 2. Therefore, an upper bound expression for p¯, denoted277
by p¯up, should be derived in closed-form for UCA in order278
to facilitate detailed theoretical analysis. Notice that for other279
array types, the method of analyzing p¯ via closed-from expres-280
sion of p¯up still works. If closed-form expressions of p¯up do281
not exist, appropriate approximations or numerical results can282
be used based on the particular form of given G(θ, θB).283
III. CLOSED-FORM EXPRESSION FOR284
THE UPPER BOUND FOR SSOP285
A. Derivation of the Upper Bound for UCA286
Firstly, a general upper bound is briefly introduced as287
follows, based on which the particular upper bound for UCA288
can be derived. For a given λe and K , p¯up can be derived289
using Jensen’s inequality.290
p¯up = 1 − exp
{
− λeπ
[
c0 Pt
K A0 + 2π
2π(K + 1)
] 2
β
}
, (12)291
where A0 denotes the pattern area and is given by,292
A0 =
∫ 2π
0
G2(θ, θB) dθ. (13)293
The derivation is described in [19]. According to (12), p¯up is294
monotonically increasing with A0 for any K and β. Therefore,295
p¯up can be analyzed via A0.296
Notice that the expression of A0 in (13) contains G(θ, θB)297
which is a general expression. To obtain the particular expres-298
sion for the UCA, the expression of A0 needs to be determined.299
We can isolate θ to solve the integral in (4).300
G2(θ, θB) = 1N
∑
i, j
e jk R[cos(θB−ψi )−cos(θB−ψ j )]301
·e− j k R[cos(θ−ψi )−cos(θ−ψ j )], (14)302
where
∑
i, j represents
∑N
i=1
∑N
j=1 and cos(θ − ψi )− 303
cos(θ − ψ j ) can be further derived by 304
cos(θ−ψi)−cos(θ−ψ j ) = 2 sin(θ− i + j −2N π) sin(
i − j
N
π). 305
(15) 306
Let Wi, j = 2 sin( i− jN π) and Zi, j = i+ j−2N π . Substituting (15) 307
into (14), G2(θ, θB) can be derived as 308
1
N
∑
i, j
e jk RWi, j sin(θB−Zi, j ) · e− j k RWi, j sin(θ−Zi, j ). (16) 309
According to Jn(x) = 12π
∫ π
−π e j (nτ−x sin τ )dτ , where Jn(x) is 310
the Bessel function of the first kind with order n, the following 311
integration can be derived. 312
∫ 2π
0
e− j k RWi, j sin(θ−Zi, j ) dθ 313
=
∫ 2π−Zi, j
−Zi, j
e j [0·τ−k RWi, j sin τ ] d(τ + Zi, j ) 314
=
∫ π
−π
e j [0·θ−k RWi, j sin τ ] dτ = 2π J0(k RWi, j ) (17) 315
Note that in the second step, the upper and lower limits can be 316
transformed to π and −π , because sin τ is a periodic function 317
with a period of 2π . 318
Combining (16) and (17), A0 in (13) can be written as 319
A0 = 2πN
∑
i, j
J0(k RWi, j )e jk RWi, j sin(θB−Zi, j ). (18) 320
The double summation of Bessel functions in (18) is 321
intractable to analyze. In the following, A0 will be further 322
simplified. Let A0,i, j denote each summation term in (18), 323
A0,i, j = 2πN J0(k RWi, j )e
jk RWi, j sin(θB−Zi, j ). (19) 324
It is deduced that Wi, j = −W j,i and Zi, j = Z j,i . Considering 325
that Jn(−x) = (−1)n Jn(x) and J0(x) is a real number, it can 326
be deduced that A0,i, j = A∗0, j,i . In addition, it can be shown 327
from the expression of Wi, j and Zi, j that Wi, j+N = −Wi, j . 328
Similarly, sin(θB − Zi, j+N ) = − sin(θB − Zi, j ). Thus, it can 329
be determined found that A0,i, j = A0,i, j+N . 330
A table of A0,i, j is shown in Fig. 3 to illustrate how to 331
use the previous properties to simplify the summation of A0 332
in (18). For N = 4, the table is extended to j = 8. As A0,i, j = 333
A0,i, j+N , the blue region is equivalent to the green region. 334
Instead of adding Ai, j for i, j from 1 to N , the summation 335
can now be executed diagonally. For convenience, let n = i− j . 336
Then, Wn = Wi, j = 2 sin( nN π). The terms A0,i, j on the red 337
diagonal lines in the table have the same Wn . In the table, 338
N
π Zi, j is allocated according to their indices i and j . Given 339
n = i − j , it can be derived that 340
Zn,i = Zi, j = i + j − 2N π =
2i − n − 2
N
π. (20) 341
Thus, it can be derived that 342
A0,n,i = A0,i, j = 2πN J0(k RWn)e
jk RWn sin(θB−Zn,i ). (21) 343
344
IEE
E P
ro
of
ZHANG et al.: SECURITY OPTIMIZATION OF EXPOSURE REGION-BASED BEAMFORMING 5
Fig. 3. Table for Zi, j , N = 4.
A0 is the summation of all elements in the original table345
(i.e., i, j = 1, . . . , 4). Because A0,i, j+N = A0,i, j , the calcula-346
tion of A0 can be executed by replacing the lower triangle in347
the original table (i.e., i > j ) with the lower triangle in the348
extended table (i.e., i > j − N). In the new formation of A0,349
which is a parallelogram table, the summation can be carried350
out along the diagonal lines from n = 0 to n = −(N −1). For351
any n, the summation of A0,n,i includes N terms with Zn,i .352
Thus, (18) can be converted into353
A0 =
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
A0,i, j =
−(N−1)∑
n=0
N∑
i=1
A0,n,i354
=
−(N−1)∑
n=0
N∑
i=1
2π
N
J0(k RWn)e jk RWn sin(θB−Zn,i )355
= 2π
N
−(N−1)∑
n=0
J0(k RWn)
N∑
i=1
e jk RWn sin(θB−Zn,i ). (22)356
According to Jacobi-Anger expansion e jα sin γ =357 ∑∞
m=−∞ Jm(α)e jmγ , (22) can be further derived by (23) at358
the bottom of the following page.359
When m = l N , l ∈ Z, e jπ mN (n+2) = e jlnπe j2πl = e jlnπ and360
N∑
i=1
e− j2π
m
N i =
N∑
i=1
e− j2πli = N. (24)361
When m = l N ,362
N∑
i=1
e− j2π
m
N i = e− j2π mN 1 − e
− j2π mN N
1 − e− j2π mN = 0. (25)363
Thus, it can be derived that364
A0 = 2πN
−(N−1)∑
n=0
J0(k RWn)
∞∑
l=−∞
JlN (k RWn)e jlNθB e jlnπ N365
= 2π
−(N−1)∑
n=0
J0(k RWn)
∞∑
l=−∞
JlN (k RWn)e jlNθB (−1)ln366
= 2π
N−1∑
n=0
J0(−k RWn)
∞∑
l=−∞
(−1)−ln JlN (−k RWn)e jlNθB367
= 2π
N−1∑
n=0
J0(k RWn)
∞∑
l=−∞
(−1)ln+lN JlN (k RWn)e jlNθB .368
(26)369
Fig. 4. Upper plot: Examples of J0(k RWn) versus R. Lower plot:
A0 versus R. N = 8, θB = 0°.
Substituting (26) in (13), the closed-form expression for p¯up 370
in (12) can be obtained. Compared to (13), the expression 371
of A0 in (26) consists of a finite summation of J0(·) and an 372
infinite summation of JlN (·), which can provide asymptotic 373
analysis. 374
B. Impact of R on A0 375
As discussed in Section II-C, the impact of R will be used 376
as a starting point to formulate the optimization problem. 377
In the low region of x , the Bessel function JlN (x) in (26) 378
is negligible for high order l N , i.e., l N  1. Let x0 denote 379
the upper limit of the range x ∈ [0, x0] where JlN (x) is 380
negligible for certain l N . Then, the specific value x0 depends 381
on the order l N . As the order l N increases, x0 increases and 382
eventually exceeds the value of 2k R, which is the upper limit 383
of x = K RWn in (26) for a fixed R. Once x0 becomes larger 384
than 2k R, all JlN (x) for l ≥ 1 are negligible in the range 385
(0, 2k R]. Thus, for sufficiently large N , A0 in (26) can be 386
approximated by 387
A0 ≈ 2π
N−1∑
n=0
J 20 (k RWn). (27) 388
The asymptotic behavior of A0 versus R can be analyzed 389
through (27). As shown in the upper plot in Fig. 4, when 390
n = 0, J0(k RW0) = 1, because W0 = 0 and J0(0) is a 391
constant that is irrelevant to R. When n = 0, J0(k RWn) 392
gradually decreases with some fluctuation as R increases, 393
which is determined by the nature of J0(·). Notice that in the 394
asymptotic expression in (27), the angle θB is neglected. When 395
N is not large enough, the term JlN (k RWn)e jlNθB also needs 396
to be considered. As Jn(x) decreases and approaches zero 397
with different convergence speed, the summation of a series of 398
Bessel functions, i.e., A0, in general decreases and approaches 399
a certain value as R increases. Due to the difference in the 400
converging speed of JlN (k RWn), there are some fluctuations. 401
An example of A0 versus R is shown in the lower plot 402
in Fig. 4 where N = 8 and θB = 0°. It can be seen 403
that A0 fluctuates as R increases, because the curve is a 404
superposition of JlN (k RWn) with different orders l N . Thus, 405
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Fig. 5. p¯ versus R for different values of θB , N = 8, Pt/σ 2n = 15 dB,
RB = 3.4594 bps/Hz, Rs = 1 bps/Hz, λe = 1 × 10−4.
in a local region, e.g., R < 2λ, the minimum value does not406
necessarily correspond to a large or small R, which leads to407
the optimization problem for R.408
IV. OPTIMIZATION ALGORITHM409
A. Refined Optimization Problem410
As mentioned in Section III-B, R can be properly designed411
according to θB to achieve a local minimum value in a certain412
range of R. According to Section II-C, dB is not involved in413
the expression of p¯. Thus, the optimization problem can be414
solved by optimizing R according to θB .415
It is worth noticing that although the closed-form expression416
of p¯up provides an asymptotic analysis on the impact of R,417
it does not provide accurate results for the optimum value418
for R. As it is intractable to analyze the expression of p¯ in (10),419
we will use numerical results to determine this.420
Examples of p¯ versus R for different θB are shown in Fig. 5421
where N = 8. For simplicity, let K → ∞ and β = 2, i.e., the422
channel is degraded to a free-space channel. More results for423
Rician fading channel will be provided in Section V-A. For the424
purpose of MATLAB simulation, the value of R is taken by425
a step of 1 cm in the range [0.4λ, 2λ]. Typical values of θB ,426
i.e., θB = 0°, 10°, 20°, are taken for the UCA with N = 8.427
Fig. 5 depicts the fluctuating behavior of p¯ with respect to R428
for different values of θB . It can be seen that the curves for429
different θB vary. Therefore, for each θB , the local minimum430
of p¯ in the range R ∈ [0.4λ, 2λ] is given by a different value431
of R. This suggests that by varying θB , a different R should432
be chosen in order to achieve a minimum p¯. However, this is433
not practical because R is usually predefined for an existing 434
UCA. 435
Since R can only be a particular value, the optimum value 436
Ropt needs to pre-designed. To this end, the minimum mean 437
error is used to find Ropt in a certain range of R that produces 438
the minimum p¯ for all possible θB ∼ U(0, 2π). To establish 439
the cost function, imagine that R is adjustable, which provides 440
the hypothetical function of p¯min with respect to θB . Notice 441
that the value of p¯min for each θB is, in fact, given by a 442
different value of R. To find Ropt , let the mean error, denoted 443
by err(R), be the mean value of the difference between p¯ and 444
p¯min over the range θB ∈ [0, 2π], 445
err(R) = EθB [ p¯ − p¯min]. (28) 446
Note that the mean error is used instead of the mean square 447
error because p¯− p¯min is always non-negative. Thus, Ropt can 448
be found by 449
Ropt = arg min
R
err(R). (29) 450
(29) can be converted into the following expression, the 451
derivation of which is in Appendix A. 452
Ropt = arg min
R
¯¯p, (30) 453
where ¯¯p is the averaged p¯ over Bob’s angles and is defined by 454
¯¯p = 1
2π
∫ 2π
0
p¯ dθB . (31) 455
B. Analysis and Implementation of Optimization Algorithm 456
Substituting the expression of p¯ in (10) into (31), the 457
expression of ¯¯p can be obtained, 458
¯¯p = 1 − 1
2π
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ 2π
0
exp
{
− λe
2
(c0 Pt )
2
β 459
×
∫ 2π
0
[ K G2C(θ, θB)
K + 1 +
x2 + y2
K + 1 460
+ 2
√
K GC(θ, θB)
K + 1 x
] 2
β dθ
}e−(x2+y2)
π
dθB dx dy. (32) 461
Although (32) can be numerically calculated, it is intractable 462
to analyze. Thus, the upper bound, denoted by ¯¯pup, is required 463
for theoretical analysis. 464
Theorem 1: 465
¯¯pup = 1 − exp
{
− λeπ
[ c0 K A¯0
2π(K + 1) +
c0
K + 1
] 2
β
}
, (33) 466
where A¯0 is the expectation of A0 over θB and is given by 467
A¯0 = 12π
∫ 2π
0
A0 dθB = 2π
N−1∑
n=0
J 20 (k RWn). (34) 468
A0 = 2πN
−(N−1)∑
n=0
J0(k RWn)
N∑
i=1
∞∑
m=−∞
Jm(k RWn)e jm(θB−Zn,i ) = 2πN
−(N−1)∑
n=0
J0(k RWn)
∞∑
m=−∞
Jm(k RWn)e jmθB
N∑
i=1
e− jm Zn,i
= 2π
N
−(N−1)∑
n=0
J0(k RWn)
∞∑
m=−∞
Jm(k RWn)e jmθB e jπ
m
N (n+2)
N∑
i=1
e− j2π
m
N i . (23)
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Fig. 6. ¯¯p versus R for all θB , N = 8, Pt/σ 2n = 15 dB, RB = 3.4594 bps/Hz,
Rs = 1 bps/Hz, λe = 1 × 10−4.
The proof of Theorem 1 is given in Appendix B. It can be seen469
that (34) has a similar composition to A0 in (26). Therefore,470
A¯0 in general decreases with some fluctuations as R increases.471
Due to the monotonically increasing relationship between ¯¯pup472
and A¯0, it can be deduced that ¯¯p decreases in general with473
some fluctuations as R increases.474
Because ¯¯p fluctuates in a certain range of R, there must475
exist at least one local minimum. Numerical results are used476
to find Ropt in (30). For example, choosing N = 8 and477
R ∈ [0.4λ, 2λ], the results of ¯¯p shown in Fig. 6 are obtained478
where the channel is chosen as a free-space channel. It can479
be seen that there is more than one local minimum. In the480
range R ∈ [0.4λ, 2λ], Ropt = 1.76λ gives the minimum ¯¯p481
as 2.4 × 10−3. Compared to the maximum value of ¯¯p that is482
3.6 × 10−3 in the same range, there is a 33% reduction in483
the value of ¯¯p. This indicates that by choosing an appropriate484
value of R, the averaged SSOP can be dramatically reduced.485
The numerical implementation of the algorithm is shown in486
Algorithm 1. The continuous ranges of R, θB , θ are discretized487
with steps of R, θB and θ , respectively. In addition,488
a limit value Q is used when calculating integral from −∞489
to ∞ in (32). For a normal distribution, a realistic value is set490
for Q, namely 3. Let NR , NθB , Nθ and NQ be the number of491
samples for R, θB , θ and the integration range Q respectively,492
which determines the iteration numbers.493
There are two main steps in the optimization algorithm.494
The first step is from line 3 to 15, where ¯¯p for a range of495
discretized R is calculated. Notice that the integrals in (32)496
are implemented via iterated summation from line 6 to 15. The497
second step section is from line 16 to 21, where the minimum498
value ¯¯pmin in the vector ¯¯p is searched to find Ropt which is499
the output of the optimization algorithm.500
The accuracy of the result increases with number of sam-501
ples; however, the compuational complexity also increases.502
The running time of the numerical implementation is approxi-503
mately O(NR NθB N2Q Nθ ). There is no specific restriction on the504
sampling interval as long as the chosen resolution generates a505
reasonable value.506
Algorithm 1 Optimization of R for Fixed N .
INPUT: σ 2n , β, K , RB , Rs , λe, λ, Pt , N
INPUT: R1, R2, R; θB1, θB2, θB ; θ1, θ2, θ ; Q, Q
OUTPUT: Ropt
1: discretize R, θB , θ , Q
2: calculate NR , NθB , Nθ , NQ and c0
3: create an 1 × NR empty vector of ¯¯p with index idx
4: for each value of R ∈ [R1, R2], θB ∈ [θB1, θB2] do
5: S1 = 0
6: for each value of x, y ∈ [−Q, Q] do
7: S2 = 0
8: for each value of θ ∈ [θ1, θ2] do
9: S2 = S2+
10:
[
K G2(θ,θB)+x2+y2+2
√
K G(θ,θB)x
K+1
] 2
β
θ
11: end for
12: S1 = S1 + exp{−λe2 (Pt c0)
2
β S2} e−(x
2+y2)
π Q2
13: end for
14: ¯¯p(idx) = ¯¯p(idx) + (1 − S1)/NθB
15: end for
16: initialization: Ropt = R1, ¯¯pmin = ¯¯p(1)
17: for each value of R ∈ [R1, R2] do
18: if ¯¯pmin > ¯¯p(idx) then
19: reassignment: Ropt = R, ¯¯pmin = ¯¯p(idx)
20: end if
21: end for
V. SIMULATION AND NUMERICAL RESULTS 507
In this section, we first provide simulation results for p¯ 508
in (10) and then numerical results for ¯¯p in (32) over the Rician 509
channel with a wider range of values of K and β. Next, the 510
numerical results of the upper bounds p¯up and ¯¯pup are shown 511
in comparison with p¯ and ¯¯p to demonstrate the validity of the 512
upper bounds. In the end, we investigate a common problem 513
in antenna array, i.e., the mutual coupling and its effect on p¯. 514
A. More Results for Rician Fading Channels 515
In Section IV-B, numerical results are used to show the 516
properties of p¯ versus R. Firstly, the simulation results are 517
provided to validate the expressions of p¯ in (10) that is derived 518
from the expression in (9) which contains Gaussian random 519
variables via |h˜2| according to (3). We choose K = 10 and 520
β = 3 as an example to compare the numerical results based 521
on the expression in (10) and the simulation results based 522
on the expression in (9). We ran Monte Carlo simulations to 523
generate 1 × 104 samples of gRe and gI m in (3). As stated in 524
Section II-C, the noise variance σ 2n , channel factors β and K , 525
the security related parameters RB and Rs and the density 526
of Eves λe are assumed to be constant; the transmit power 527
Pt does not affect the impact of the array parameters to the 528
SSOP. In this section, Pt and σ 2n are set to −65 dBm and 529
−80 dBm, respectively. The rate of the transmitted codewords 530
RB is set to 3.4594 bps/Hz which corresponds to a received 531
SNR of 10 dB for Bob. The rate of the confidential information 532
Rs is set to be smaller than RB , e.g., 1 bps/Hz as used in [18]. 533
The density of Eves is set to 1×10−4 which means 100 Eves 534
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Fig. 7. Simulation and numerical results for p¯ versus R; K = 10,
β = 3, θB = 0° Pt/σ 2n = 15 dB, RB = 3.4594 bps/Hz, Rs = 1 bps/Hz,
λe = 1 × 10−4.
Fig. 8. Numerical results for ¯¯p versus R; Pt/σ 2n = 15 dB,
RB = 3.4594 bps/Hz, Rs = 1 bps/Hz, λe = 1 × 10−4.
in 1000 × 1000 m2. Finally, the radius of the UCA is set535
to [0.4λ, 2λ], which corresponds to [5, 25] cm for 2.4 GHz536
frequency. For comparison, a commercial uniform circular537
array FCI-3710 developed by Fidelity Comtech has 15.24 cm538
radius [29]. The simulation and numerical results plotted in539
Fig. 7 show a good match between them, which verifies the540
validity of the expressions in (10).541
Secondly, a wider range of K and β for Rician channel542
will be examined. We choose typical value of β = 3, 5 and543
K = 1, 10. The results of ¯¯p is calculated according to (32). As544
shown in Fig. 8, all curves exhibit similar trend with regard to545
R to the curve in Fig. 6 where K → ∞ and β = 2. In addition,546
for both curves in Fig. 8, the optimum value Ropt in the range547
R ∈ [0.4λ, 2λ] is 1.76λ. It means that the optimum value of548
R in a certain range is valid for Rician channels with different549
K and β.550
B. Numerical Results of the Upper Bounds551
Next, closed-form expressions of p¯up and ¯¯pup are derived552
in Section III-A and Section IV-B, respectively, in order to553
facilitate analysis. Here, some numerical results are shown to554
Fig. 9. Numerical results for p¯ and p¯up versus R; β = 3, Pt/σ 2n = 15 dB,
RB = 3.4594 bps/Hz, Rs = 1 bps/Hz, λe = 1 × 10−4.
Fig. 10. Numerical results for ¯¯p and ¯¯pup versus R; β = 3, Pt/σ 2n = 15 dB,
RB = 3.4594 bps/Hz, Rs = 1 bps/Hz, λe = 1 × 10−4.
demonstrate that the upper bounds can reflect the fluctuating 555
behavior of p¯ and ¯¯p against R. 556
In Fig. 9, the results for p¯ and p¯up versus R are shown for 557
typical values of β = 3 and K = 1, 10. It can be seen that 558
the curves of p¯up have a similar shape to the curves of p¯, and 559
the value of p¯up is close to p¯up. This suggests that the upper 560
bound can very well reflect the property of p¯. 561
In Fig. 10, the results for ¯¯p and ¯¯pup versus R are shown for 562
typical values of β = 3 and K = 1, 10. It can be seen that the 563
curves for ¯¯p and ¯¯pup have a similar shape, and the values of 564¯¯p and ¯¯pup are close to each other, which means that ¯¯pup is a 565
good upper bound. 566
C. Impact of Mutual Coupling 567
The mutual coupling is caused by energy absorption 568
between proximate antennas and causes distortion to the array 569
factor G(θ, θB), and thus affects p¯ and the optimization 570
algorithm. In this paper, we choose the NEC tool [26] to build 571
a numerical model as an example to examine the impact of 572
the mutual coupling, although any analytical model will apply. 573
IEE
E P
ro
of
ZHANG et al.: SECURITY OPTIMIZATION OF EXPOSURE REGION-BASED BEAMFORMING 9
Fig. 11. Example of theoretical and NEC simulated patterns, N = 8,
R = 0.8λ, θB = 0°.
The NEC tool serves as a numerical method to calculate array574
patterns that include the mutual coupling effect, and its results575
are well accepted in the literature [30], [31].576
An example shown in Fig. 11 illustrates the difference577
caused by the mutual coupling for system configurations with578
N = 8, R = 0.8λ, θB = 0°. The array pattern with the mutual579
coupling is calculated by the NEC simulation. It can be seen580
that there is not much difference in the main beam, but with581
deviation in the sidelobes.582
To measure the array pattern distortion caused by the mutual583
coupling, Pearson’s correlation coefficient, denoted by ρ,584
is adopted. It measures the correlation between two variables585
X and Y , as defined by586
ρ = cov(X, Y )
std(X) · std(Y ) , (35)587
where cov(·, ·) stands for the covariance and std(·) the stan-588
dard deviation. ρ between the theoretical array pattern and589
the simulated array pattern via NEC tool can be calculated to590
quantify their similarity. The larger ρ is, the more alike two591
patterns are.592
The patterns of the UCA with a range of radius are593
simulated in NEC. For N = 8, typical values are chosen, i.e.,594
θB = 0°, 10°, 20° in the range R = [0.4λ, 2λ]. The correlation595
coefficient, ρ, between the theoretical and NEC patterns is596
calculated and the results are shown in Fig. 12. It can be seen597
that ρ is generally above 0.8 in the range of R = [0.4λ, 2λ],598
except for R = 0.48λ. This shows that the mutual coupling599
does not cause a significant distortion to the pattern of UCA.600
The high correlation between the theoretical and NEC patterns601
indicates that the optimization algorithm, which is based on602
empirical results on the theoretical patterns, can still work603
when considering the mutual coupling.604
On the other hand, there exists some differences between the605
theoretical and NEC patterns, which means that when calculat-606
ing Ropt in the numerical implementation of the optimization607
algorithm, the NEC simulation data instead of the theoretical608
data should be used. To compare with Fig. 5, the same array609
parameters are adopted, i.e., N = 8 and R ∈ [0.4λ, 2λ],610
Fig. 12. Correlation coefficients between theoretical and NEC simulated
patterns, N = 8, Pt/σ 2n = 15 dB, RB = 3.4594 bps/Hz, Rs = 1 bps/Hz,
λe = 1 × 10−4.
Fig. 13. Upper plot: p¯ versus R. Lower plot: ¯¯p versus R. N = 8,
Pt/σ 2n = 15 dB, RB = 3.4594 bps/Hz, Rs = 1 bps/Hz, λe = 1 × 10−4.
and p¯ with the mutual coupling is calculated based on the 611
NEC simulation data. The results are shown in the upper 612
plot in Fig. 13. Compared to Fig. 5, it is not hard to notice 613
the similarity between the theoretical and NEC simulated 614
curves for the same θB , which can be explained by the high 615
correlation between them, as shown in Fig. 12. 616
Because of the differences between the theoretical and 617
NEC simulated results, ¯¯p in Fig. 6 needs to be re-calculated 618
based on the NEC simulation data, in order to find Ropt . The 619
lower plot in Fig. 13 shows ¯¯p based on the NEC simulation 620
data in comparison with the theoretical curve. It can be 621
seen that the optimum value for the NEC simulation data is 622
Ropt = 1.6λ compared to Ropt = 1.76λ for the theoretical 623
result. By choosing Ropt = 1.6λ, the value of ¯¯p is reduced 624
dramatically by about 59% compared to the maximum value 625
of ¯¯p at R = 0.4λ. 626
VI. CONCLUSIONS 627
This paper investigated the security performance of 628
ER-based beamforming system with the UCA in the presence 629
of PPP distributed Eves in Rician fading channel. With the aid 630
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of the expression of the averaged SSOP and the closed-form631
expression of its upper bound, an optimization algorithm with632
regard to the radius was developed to minimize the SSOP.633
This paper provides a mathematical relationship which allows634
the radius to be optimized for a given UCA with a certain635
number of elements. The optimization algorithm is still valid636
for mutual coupling in practice, however, the optimum value637
needs to be calculated based on the NEC simulation data. In638
this work, it is assumed that Bob’s location is known by Alice639
beforehand. In practice, there could be inaccuracy in Bob’s640
location information at Alice, whether Bob sends his location641
to Alice or Alice estimates Bob’s location. In future work,642
it can be extended to include the impact of error in Bob’s643
location when optimizing the array parameters in practice. We644
will also extend our work considering random locations of645
Bob.646
APPENDIX A647
CONVERSION OF OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM648
Because θB ∼ U(0, 2π), err(R) can be calculated by649
err(R) = 1
2π
∫ 2π
0
( p¯ − p¯min) dθB. (36)650
To find the minimum value of err(R), the zeros of the partial651
derivative of err(R) with respect to R are calculated,652
∂
∂ R
err(R) = 0 (37)653
⇒ ∂
∂ R
1
2π
∫ 2π
0
( p¯ − p¯min) dθB = 0 (38)654
⇒ 1
2π
∫ 2π
0
(
∂
∂ R
p¯ − ∂
∂ R
p¯min) dθB = 0. (39)655
Because p¯min is a fixed value for certain θB and only depends656
on θB , the partial derivative ∂∂ R p¯min = 0. Thus, it can be657
derived that658
∂
∂ R
err(R) = 0 (40)659
⇒ 1
2π
∫ 2π
0
∂
∂ R
p¯ dθB = 0 (41)660
⇒ ∂
∂ R
1
2π
∫ 2π
0
p¯ dθB = 0 (42)661
⇒ ∂
∂ R
¯¯p = 0, (43)662
where ¯¯p is the averaged SSOP over Bob’s angle and is663
defined by664
¯¯p = 1
2π
∫ 2π
0
p¯ dθB. (44)665
Thus, we can obtain666
Ropt = arg min
R
¯¯p. (45)667
APPENDIX B 668
PROOF OF THEOREM 1 669
To obtain the upper bound ¯¯pup, two instances of Jensen’s 670
inequality will be used to derive p¯up. 671
E[eX ] ≥ eE[X ], (46) 672
where X is a random variable. The equality holds if and 673
only if X is a deterministic value. The other one involved 674
is expressed by 675
E[X 2β ] ≤ (E[X]) 2β , (47) 676
where X is a random variable and β ≥ 2. The equality holds 677
when β = 2 for any X . 678
The upper bound ¯¯pup can be derived based on p¯ ≤ p¯up. 679
Using (12), it can be derived that 680
¯¯p = EθB [ p¯] ≤ EθB [ p¯up] 681
= 1 − EθB
[
exp
{
−λeπ
[ c0 K
2π(K +1) A0+
c0
K +1
] 2
β
}]
. (48) 682
Using (46) and (47), it can be derived that 683
1 − EθB
[
exp
{
− λeπ
[ c0 K
2π(K + 1) A0 +
c0
K + 1
] 2
β
}]
(49) 684
< 1 − exp
{
−λeπEθB
[[ c0 K
2π(K +1) A0+
c0
K +1
] 2
β
]}
(50) 685
≤ 1 − exp
{
−λeπ
[ c0 K
2π(K +1)EθB [A0]+
c0
K +1
] 2
β
}
. (51) 686
The equality in (50) does not hold because θB is random in 687
this case. Then, ¯¯pup can be obtained by 688
¯¯pup = 1 − exp
{
− λeπ
[ c0 K A¯0
2π(K + 1) +
c0
K + 1
] 2
β
}
, (52) 689
where A¯0 is the expectation of A0 over θB and is given by 690
A¯0 = EθB [A0] =
1
2π
∫ 2π
0
A0 dθB. (53) 691
The above equation can be calculated from (26) by directly 692
solving the integral. Because 693
∫ 2π
0
e jlNθB dθB = 0, for l = 0 (54) 694
it can be obtained that 695
A¯0 = 2π
N−1∑
n=0
J 20 (2k R sin(
n
N
π)). (55) 696
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